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CONSUMERS AND THE CODE: THE SEARCH
FOR THE PROPER FORMULA
FRED H. MILLER*
PROLOGUE
In the 1940s and early 1950s, the concept of discrete legal rules applicable
in consumer transactions was only beginning to emerge.' Generally, one rule
was the norm, applicable whether both parties to a transaction were
merchants or one was a merchant and one was an individual acquiring the
property or services for personal, family, or household use (a "consumer").
2
However, even at this early stage there was recognition that the same legal
rule that works well for commercial parties might not work as well where a
consumer is involved. Commercial "law," for one matter, generally was
determinable by the parties. That is, commercial law statutes or cases
provided so-called "default" rules applicable for the most part only when the
parties did not set their own standard by agreement. In a consumer context,
such "freedom of contract" is a license for the unscrupulous to take unfair
advantage of the consumer. Most consumers are not equal to merchants in
knowledge or sophistication. Accordingly, consumers may not recognize the
* Kenneth McAfee Centennial Professor and George Lynn Cross Research Professor, University
of Oklahoma College of Law. The author also is a member of the American Law Institute ("Institute' or
"ALr') and Executive Director of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
("NCCUSL" or "Conference") which, along with the ALI, is a co-sponsor of the Uniform Commercial
Code ("UCC" or "Code"). The views expressed are those of the author personally and not those of the
Institute, the Conference, or any of their members.
1. For example, Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 137 S.W.2d 260 (Ark. 1940) and Mutual
Finance Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953), were two of the earliest cases to erode the commercial
holder-in-due-course doctrine in negotiable instruments law to protect consumers. One basis for the
decisions was that the assignee financing agency was "in a far better position to protect [its] interests
against unscrupulous and insolvent dealers," presumably because it had more knowledge and bargaining
power than did the consumer who signed the note. Martin, 63 So. 2d at 653. The perceived absence of
adequate knowledge and the inability to bargain in the case of the average consumer is the force that
prompts the view consumers need special provisions.
2. Perhaps the most significant exception to this observation at the time was in the case of usury
statutes eroded by small loan and installment loan acts, retail installment sale acts, and the like. However,
even here the approach was a usury statute of general applicability, with separate exceptions making
special provisions for sales credit and for small consumer loans and perhaps other types of consumer
credit. See, e.g., Report of the National Commission on Consumer Finance, Consumer Credit in the United
States chs. 6, 7 (1972). Reflecting an approach later used in original UCC Article 2, there often was a
special "merchant" rule as well, denying the defense of usury to corporations.
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possible adverse consequences that could flow from contract provisions
drafted by counsel for the merchant. Even more to the point, they might not
be able to understand the meaning of many provisions drafted in legal
language, even if the detrimental consequences that might flow from such
provisions would be reasonably apparent.
For another matter, consumers are seldom familiar with the default law, or
the usages and practices of the commercial world, that will apply to the
transaction absent a contrary agreement. Thus uneducated, the consumer
often may not take the appropriate steps necessary to protect against certain
eventualities. In short, freedom of contract in the case of a consumer not only
can be used abusively, but where it could be used by the consumer to his or
her advantage, it usually will not be. The classic example is the average
consumer's failure to understand that a check given for a purchase more
likely than not will operate to shift the burden of obtaining recourse for a
nondelivered or defective product to the consumer Even if payment is
stopped in time, the burden shifts because there will likely be a holder in due
course somewhere in the collection chain. The legal aid remedy, of course,
was to educate consumers to strike out the "words of negotiability," which is
a "contractual" solution to the problem.4
Finally, even if the consumer might possess the knowledge to recognize
the possible danger and devise a contractual provision to protect his or her
interests, seldom does the consumer have the ability to bargain his or her way
into an acceptable contract. Most consumer transactions are too
inconsequential, taken one by one, to permit or accommodate individual
dealmaking; the usual option is to take it or leave it.
When a lawsuit occurred over particularly egregious consequences that
arose from time to time out of these circumstances,' by and large the courts
3. See U.C.C. §§ 4-201,4-210,4-211,3-302,3-305 (1995).
4. This will no longer work, however. See U.C.C. § 3-104(c) (1995). Today the educational effort
should be in favor of using a credit card. See Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.12(c), .13(a)(3), (c) (1996)
(claims and defenses against card issuers and consumer-friendly billing error resolution provisions).
5. Litigation to enforce consumer rights under the UCC is not unknown, but faces significant
obstacles. One obstacle is that amounts involved often are relatively small, and thus economically it makes
more sense to drop the matter, if the other side shows no inclination to settle, or declare bankruptcy. A
second obstacle is that the legal resolution of the dispute often will be unclear. what constitutes a
"reasonable time," a "commercially reasonable sale," and so on. Rubbery rules reduce bargaining power
for consumers. They also raise legal costs, and, for the most part, even if the consumer wins the lawsuit, he
or she will have to pay his or her attorney, considerably eroding or even exceeding the compensatory
relief
In these circumstances, courts often strive to compensate for the obstacles. Awards of punitive
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fashioned some sort of relief.6 Aside from the lesser efficiency in adjusting
these consequences after the fact, there are more costly results in this
approach. When the courts have to develop relief for consumers on a case-by-
case basis by slowly eroding a general rule, the ultimate result may be a new,
more protective, and perhaps more efficient, rule. However, great uncertainty
during the evolutionary period for the new rule will result, because it is not
clear for this period whether a particular case or cases should be isolated to
their facts, or whether they instead represent a new and evolving rule that
qualifies the general rule in yet an unknown way. Generations of commercial
law students have been told by their professors that whatever the commercial
law rule is, no matter how bad, it is better than not knowing what the rule is.7
If that is true, the described circumstances represent the worst of all possible
situations!
I. THE CODE MEETS CONSUMERISM
A. The Early Years
By the time the Code was being drafted in the late 1940s, the observations
described above were of considerable concern to the persons working on the
new statute. We are told that Karl Llewellyn not only perceived the need for a
release valve to allow courts to reach reasonable decisions in "hard" cases
without doing violence to the certainty needed for commercial law rules,9 but
damages where the conduct is not really that bad, and fashioning rules like the "absolute bar" rule
against deficiency judgments in UCC Article 9 cases, are examples that are common enough so as to
permit consumer lawsuits to accomplish some control function. A more direct approach might be
preferable, however. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2A-108(4) (1995) (the unconscionability provisions of Article
2A award "reasonable attorney fees" in a consumer lease).
6. See, e.g., supra note 1.
7. That is to say, commerce thrives on certainty as, after all, most bad rules can be changed by
the agreement of the parties.
8. There was an additional price ultimately paid because of this approach. The approach largely
excluded special consumer rules from the Code. Thus, consumer rules developed elsewhere in the law. In
some cases the development elsewhere was useful because all the special rules could be considered
together and their aggregate impact assessed, and then an appropriate balance could be reached. But the
result in most cases was actual, although not always apparent, nonuniformity, except where the rule was
based in federal law, or the concept was so limited that undue variance was simply unlikely, as in the case
of state lemon laws. Nonuniformity in the consumer context is perhaps not as deleterious as commercial
nonuniformity, but from the author's experience in constructing multistate consumer credit programs in
states where the law is nonuniform, as contrasted with, for example, states which have enacted the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code, it extracts a significant and largely unnecessary cost.
9. The release valve chosen was explicit recognition of the doctrine of unconscionability. U.C.C. §
2-302 (1995). As Official Comment 1 observes:
1997]
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
that he also was of the opinion that the statute should differentiate between
consumers and professionals.' This differentiation was to be accomplished
through the so-called "merchant rules," which created a different standard in
appropriate circumstances "between merchants."" However, in the end,
Llewellyn's grand scheme for the incorporation of inverse special consumer
rules into Article 2 largely failed because the arguably limited vision of others
forced necessary compromises that left only a patchwork of the merchant
rules remaining in the final version of Article 2.
Similar experiences occurred with respect to Article 9. There the drafters'
approach was more direct, and early versions of Article 9 extensively
addressed the special problems involved in consumer finance. For example,
an early draft included consumer provisions that have survived to today,
which invalidated most after-acquired property interests,' 2 allowed some
good faith purchasers to take property free of a security interest, 3 subjected
assignees to contract defenses, 4 and regulated rights upon default. 5 Other
provisions, which have not survived to today, included ones that provided for
discharge due to insurance payments, regulated the form of the contract
including various disclosures of credit terms and default rights, and regulated
certain practices such as add-on contracts. 6 These provisions met with far
less than universal approval, and among other objections, charges of
discrimination against certain types of creditors were asserted. 7 At the end of
This section is intended to make it possible for the courts to police explicitly against the contracts or
clauses which they find to be unconscionable. In the past such policing has been accomplished by
adverse construction of language, by manipulation of the rules of offer and acceptance or by
determinations that the clause is contrary to public policy or to the dominant purpose of the
contract.
Id. at cmt. 1. To lower the uncertainty this injected, unconscionability was made a matter for the court.
Id. § 2-302(1). Ultimately, this approach would build a considerable body of precedent, as opposed to
unpredictable fact finding, thus leading to a body of new "consumer type" rules.
10. Zipporah B. Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV.
L. REv. 465,492 (1987).
11. See U.C.C. § 2-104(1), (3) (1995) (defining "merchant" and "between merchants"); id. § 2-
201(2) (statute of frauds exception for merchants); id. § 2-209(2) (special "private statute of frauds rule"
for merchants); id. § 2-314(2) (implied warranty of merchantability only made by "a merchant with respect
to goods of that kind").
12. U.C.C. § 9-204(2) (1995). For a discussion of the drafting history, see G. GILMORE,
SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 9.2 (1965).
13. U.C.C. § 9-307(2) (1995).
14. Id. § 9-206(1).
15. Id. § 9-501(3).
16. 1 GILMORE, supra note 12, § 9.2 n.8.
17. Id. § 9.2, at293.
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the day, compromises necessary to build a consensus left out all but a handful
of the special consumer provisions."
B. All Quiet on the Consumer Front
There is no question that the original compromises described above with
respect to Articles 2 and 9 allowed widespread enactment of the initial
version of the Code with relatively few explicit nonuniform amendments.'
Accordingly, most of the special consumer rules were developed outside of
the Code,20 making appearances of uniformity deceiving and compounding
complexity in the cases of the consumer rules. Further, imperfect
coordination among the laws led to appropriate policy not always being
systematically effectuated.
To provide merely one illustration of these consequences, consider the
slow death of the holder-in-due-course doctrine in consumer transactions in
negotiable instruments and related law. The story begins with a case-law
doctrine denying holder-in-due-course status, which allows freedom from
most defenses to payment, to assignee holders of consumer payment
obligations who are in "close connection" with the person who dealt with the
consumer and who provided the consumer with allegedly defective goods, or
perhaps failed to deliver at all.2 The next chapter of the story involves a spate
of state legislation more directly denying holder-in-due-course status to the
purchasers of assigned credit sale paper.' Inevitably, the practice of making a
direct loan to the consumer (so-called "dragging the body") developed to
avoid the restrictions relating to assigned paper.' This development spawned
18. Id
19. To illustrate, a number of states restrict disclaimers or limits on remedies in consumer sales
(Vermont, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Maryland, Maine, and Connecticut are
examples), and some have added provisions for a minimum recovery and attorneys' fees or limiting a
deficiency for secured-party misconduct or limiting the property that a security interest can be taken in
(Oregon, Ohio, Connecticut, and California are examples). However, there also are separate statutes that
modify the Code without explicitly amending it. State "lemon laws" are an example. See statutes cited
infra note 20.
20. Examples are state "lemon laws," e.g. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.15, § 901 (West 1993); the so-called
Magnuson-Moss Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2310 (1994); state and federal holder-in-due-course limitations
as in the UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §§ 3A03-A05 (1974) and the Federal Trade Commission so-
called "Holder" rule, 16 C.F.R. pt 433 (1996); the Federal Trade Commission Credit Practices Rule, 16
C.F.R. pt. 444 (1996); and the Expedited Funds Availability Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4010 (1994).
21. See supra note 1. See generally FRED H. MILLER & ALVIN C. HARRELL, THE LAW OF MODERN
PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND NOTES § 3.04 (2d ed. 1992).
22. E.g., UNIF. CONSUMER CREDrr CODE § 3.404 (1974).
23. See, e.g., Fred H. Miller, An Alternative Response to the Supposed Direct Loan Loophole in
1997]
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yet additional state legislation to prevent that evasion of protection.24 When
enough consensus had been reached the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC")
acted and promulgated its trade regulation rule on Preservation of
Consumers' Claims and Defenses, which addressed both of the above
circumstances.' This rule was added on top of the state regulation.26
However, the FTC rule did not address the situation where a third-party credit
card, like a bank credit card, was used; rather, that became the subject of a
federal statute, which provided a similar, but different, result.27 The FTC rule,
and many state laws, also addressed clauses that sought to confer holder-in-
due-course status by agreement rather than by negotiability, so-called "waiver
of defenses clauses."28 But the FTC rule does not extend to the first cousin of
such clauses, the so-called "hell or high water" clause in a true lease of
goods,29 nor does it extend to letters of credit issued by consumers
independent of the underlying consumer transaction.3" Those variations had to
be dealt with by state law, if at all.3" The one unitary effort to restore
uniformity, to create consistency of policy and to minimize complexity in the
payments area, was summarily murdered a number of years ago at the
inception of the current Code revision effort.32
the UCCC, 24 OKLA, L. REv. 427,433-38 (1971).
24. E.g., UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE§ 3A05 (1974).
25. 16 C.F.R. pt. 433 (1996).
26. Ajoint federal-state presence in the same legal area inevitably generates a new level of problems
of interrelationship, and this situation did not represent an exception. For example, did failure to comply
with the FTC rule constitute notice of a defense or a lack of good faith so as to deprive a person, who
otherwise would be a holder in due course under state law, of that status? See, e.g., Capital Bank & Trust
Co. v. Lacey, 393 So. 2d 668 (La. 1980). Even worse, did compliance with the FTC rule destroy
negotiability, so as to have far greater consequences under state law than merely the loss of holder in due
course status? See U.C.C. § 3-106(d) (1995).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1666i (1994); 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(c) (1996); see also UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT
CODE § 3.403 (1974).
28. In such a clause, the consumer agrees not to assert against any assignee of the contract any
claim or defense that might be asserted against the assignor. The consideration was the assignee's
purchase of the contract in reliance.
29. See U.C.C. § 2A-407 (1995). This type of clause agrees the lessee's duty to pay is
independent of the obligations of the lessor.
30. UCC section 5-102(a)(9) prevents an individual issuing a letter of credit for a consumer
purpose because of the independence principle of section 5-103(d). See id. §§ 5-102 & cmt. 5, 5-
103(d).
31. See, e.g., UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 3.404 (1974); U.C.C. § 2A-407(3) (1995) (not
impairing other law on a "hell or high water" clause); id. § 5-102(a)(9) (defining "issuer" of a "letter of
credit").
32. See Fred H. Miller, Report on the New Payments Code, 41 BUS. LAW. 1007 (1986). Certain
conclusions were drawn from this event that influenced the later Code revisions, as described infra Part
I.C.
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C. The Gathering Storm
The genesis of the current effort to revise the Code comes from changes in
business practices and technology 33 and from perceived deficiencies and
ambiguities in the statute.34 This revision effort is widespread and not limited
as were the completed 1970s revisions to Articles 9 and 8.3' For that reason,
the question of the role, if any, for special consumer provisions in the Code
has arisen in this new effort for the first time since the late 1940s.
The first project in the current revision efforts was Article 2A on the
leasing of goods.36 This author, as a member of that drafting committee,
31
33. For example, before UCC Article 3 was revised, under most decisions variable rate notes were
not construed to be within that Article. See. e.g., Farmers Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Arena, 481 A.2d 1064 (Vt.
1984) (construing variable rate notes as not negotiable instruments under pre-Revised Article 3). But see
Goss v. Trinity Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 813 P.2d 492 (Okla. 1991) (variable rate note falls within UCC and
gives the parties rights described in the UCC). The whole modem system involving the indirect holding of
investment securities was also largely missing from Article 8 before its revision. The leasing industry was
struggling along under piece-meal rules developed by analogy from Article 2 before Article 2A was
prepared. The same was true for commercial (electronic) funds transfers prior to Article 4A. Before
revision of Article 4, the check collection system operated more under agreement than under Article 4
because the old Article 4 was written with paper in mind even though the era of automated check
processing was dawning at the time of its drafting.
34. Article 5, being deliberately skeletal as the first codification of letter of credit law and because
the operational rules were already well understood by experienced issuers, proved not up to the task when
inexperienced issuers, applicants, and beneficiaries, unfamiliar with the extra-statutory practice, began to
use credits. It also failed to withstand greater pressures brought on by the development of standby credits.
Thus, Article 5 had to be revised. Ambiguities in the scheme of Article 3 for allocating losses from
forgeries and alterations were an important consideration in the decision to rewrite those rules as well.
35. A second difference is that the prior revisions were accomplished by the Permanent Editorial
Board ("PEB") for the Code and involved a much smaller participatory base than the current Code revision
efforts do, as described in this article. This difference in degree of participation was perceived to have had
a direct and substantial effect on the acceptance of the rules developed in those earlier efforts and was also
thought to have contributed to their slow enactment. The failure to reach consensus because of less than
adequate participation in the third and last effort of the PEB to update the Code represented by the New
Payments Code also left an important legacy. See generally Miller, supra note 32. As a result, the PEB no
longer prepares drafts, and instead that is done by a drafting committee composed of Conference and
Institute members in open discussion with advisers and observers.
36. See U.C.C. §§ 2A-102, 2A-103(l)(h), (j) (1995) for a general introduction into what is covered
by Article 2A.
37. Article 2A began as a uniform act outside the Code because the Institute schedule was described
as too crowded to accommodate such a new project. Ultimately, after the Personal Property Leasing Act
was largely developed, the Institute schedule became less congested and the act was reconsigned to a
drafting committee with Institute representation to be reworked into new Article 2A of the Code.
Subsequent revisions or additions to the Code then came along very rapidly, so much so that the Institute's
schedule again experienced difficulty in accommodating all the projects. By the time of this writing, the
schedule of the Conference is also burdened. As a result, while the Institute has scheduled its final
consideration of Article 9 to occur before that of the Conference, each of Articles 2, 2A (which must be
conformed to changes in Article 2) and new 2B, will be considered by the Conference before consideration
Washington University Open Scholarship
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explored the possibility of obtaining consumer organization representation
during drafting committee sessions from at least one nationally recognized
consumer organization. The organization advised the author that no one had
expertise in the subject of consumer leasing, except as related to the Federal
Consumer Leasing Act.38
Nonetheless, the author and Professor William E. Hogan, a Commissioner
to the Conference from New York and a member of the drafting committee,
both of whom had worked on the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, believed
that a new Code Article could not be widely accepted in the 1980s without
some additional attention being given to consumer issues. The author and
Commissioner Hogan accordingly prepared a list often or so possible special
consumer protection provisions, drawn from the 1974 Uniform Consumer
Credit Code, for possible inclusion in Article 2A. The reception to this list on
the part of some advisers and observers, and even by some members of the
drafting committee, must have replicated, to a degree, the Article 9
experience of forty years before; there was less than full agreement about the
need to include some provisions, as well as over details. Nevertheless, while
the right to cure a default in payment and some other proposed rules did not
survive, a considerable number did.39 More might have survived were it not
for remembrance of the strong, indeed vehement, opposition to the inclusion
of special consumer provisions in the New Payments Code; that opposition
came both from industry (there were too many provisions) and consumers
(there were too few provisions). 40 As a consequence, the special consumer
provisions added to Article 2A were designed only to "level the playing
field"--that is, protect against the worst kind of abuse that might flow from
unlimited freedom of contract. Therefore, the effort turned out to be a very
modest initial excursus.
Even so, the Article 2A consumer provisions were not uniformly accepted
in the enactment process: some were dropped,4e ' some were changed,42 and
in final form by the Institute. All Articles, including revisions to Article I, are scheduled for completion in
1998. The matter of consistency in approach to issues, including consumer issues, is an important focal
point of the entire revision effort.
38. Consumer Leasing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1667-1667e (1994).
39. SeeU.C.C. § 2A-104 cmt. 4(1995).
40. See generally Fred H. Miller, Report on the New Payments Code, 39 BUs. LAW. 1215 (1984);
Miller, supra note 32.
41. For example, Florida did not enact subsections (2) and (4) of UCC section 2A-108 on
unconscionable inducement and collection in a consumer lease and providing for recovery of
attorney's fees. Compare U.C.C. § 2A-108 (1995) with FLA. STAT. ANN. § 680.1081 (,Vest Supp.
1996).
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some additional ones were added.4 3 Moreover, in several states Article 2A
was stalled for a time or has not been enacted because its modest approach is
viewed as too modest.' In some states, only when a separate consumer
leasing act was also agreed upon or enacted was Article 2A passed into law.45
The National Conference has now begun work on a separate consumer
leasing act to foster a greater degree of uniformity on a subject for which
there clearly is some demand in the states. It is also hoped that this effort will
facilitate completion of the enactment of Article 2A, where the lack of special
consumer protection provisions has been a stumbling block. Of course, this
effort is occurring outside and not within the Code, but the end result will be
the same if the demand for uniform legislation is sufficient. This approach
will also provide comparison to the approach of inclusion of consumer
provisions selected for Articles 2 and 9, but the timing and the circumstances
are different enough that a comparison may be all that can be derived.
A second Code revision effort picked up where the New Payments Code
faltered and focused on Articles 3 and 4 governing negotiable instruments
and bank deposits and collections.46 Again, at the very beginning of this new
project, overtures were made to consumer organizations for representation at
the drafting sessions. However, the invitations largely fell on deaf ears,47 and
Articles 3 and 4 emerged with virtually no special consumer protection rules.
Some have argued that this demonstrates a flaw in the drafting process and
that the uniform acts, developed when all interest groups do not participate,
lack validity. The assumption is that when one or more groups are not
represented, other special interest groups, in the case of Articles 3 and 4, the
banking industry, may dominate the drafting process. That is a myopic
42. For example, California changed UCC section 2A-201 so all consumer leases must be written
to be enforceable. Compare U.C.C. § 2A-201 (1995) with CAL. COM. CODE. § 10201(a) (West Supp.
1997).
43. For example, California added more explicit limitations on choice of forum in a consumer
lease. Compare U.C.C. § 2A-106 (1995) with CAL. COM. CODE § 10106(b) (West Supp. 1997).
44. For example, Connecticut has yet to adopt Article 2A. 1B U.L.A. Supp. 148 (Supp. 1996).
45. This occurred in New York and New Jersey.
46. See Miller, supra note 32.
47. See Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., The UCCProcess-Consensus and Balance, 28 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 287
(1994). Interestingly, there had been consumer representation during the New Payments Code project. This
"second" effort included new Article 4A as well. However, Article 4A basically does not deal with
consumer transactions; instead, it leaves that to federal law in the Electronic Fund Transfers Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1693-1693r (1994). See U.C.C. § 4A-108 (1995) (stating that Article 4A does not apply to transactions
governed by federal law). The same absence of relevance to consumers is fundamentally true for UCC
Article 5 on letters of credit; Article 6 on bulk sales; and Article 8 on investment securities (the consumers
in Article 8, if they can be called that, hardly being people of small resources and sophistication).
1997]
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view.48 Clearly, widespread participation at the drafting stage tends to
facilitate production of a fairer and more balanced statute. However, the
Conference and the Institute process is designed to produce fair and balanced
statutes and does so without the necessity of complete outside participation.
Moreover, once a Code addition or revision is completed by the Conference
and the Institute, it is not law. It must still be enacted on a state-by-state basis.
If a group that did not previously participate for some reason in the drafting
raises a persuasive objection at this point, the proposed statute or its Official
Comments may well be changed. This is precisely what happened to Articles
3 and 4 in California and in several other jurisdictions.49
To elaborate on the above discussion, the failure of an interest group to
participate in the drafting is not fatal to obtaining provisions that it might
otherwise advocate. To be specific, many Commissioners and members of the
Institute have a consumer viewpoint or are sensitive to that point of view. For
example, a variety of special consumer protection provisions came into
Article 2A without any consumer organization representation in the drafting
process, even though the leasing industry was present and quite vocal in
opposition to those special provisions being included."0 Consumer protection,
unheralded, even slipped into Article 5" without being especially advocated.
Special consumer protection provisions are sparse in revised Articles 3
and 4 for reasons other than lack of representation. First, to a significant
degree, as has already been alluded to, a large body of consumer protection
rules involving negotiable instruments already exists outside the Code. The
FTC trade regulation rule on Preservation of Consumers' Claims and
Defenses,52 the Expedited Funds Availability Act,53 and various other state
laws 4 are merely some examples. Second, for the most part, there was a
48. See, e.g., Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Lavs Process:
Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83 (1993); Edward L. Rubin,
Thinking Like a Lawyer, Acting Like a Lobbyist: Some Notes on the Process of Revising UCC Articles 3
and 4, 26 LOY. LA L. REV. 743 (1993). The basic problem with these lessons is the teachers never
actually attended the classes.
49. See Gail K. Hillebrand, UCC Articles 3 and 4 in the California Legislature: A New Focus on
Consumer Protection in Uniform Law Proposals, 47 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 123 (1993).
50. See text preceding supra note 40.
51. See U.C.C. § 5-102(aX9) & cmt. 5 (1995) (prohibiting consumers from issuing letters of credit as
violative of the policy underlying the FTC trade regulation rule on Preservation of Consumers' Claims and
Defenses).
52. 16 C.F.R. pt. 433 (1996); see also U.C.C. § 3-302(g) (1995) (stating that section 3-302 is subject
to any law which limits holder-in-due-course status in specific transactions).
53. 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4010 (1994) (implemented by Regulation CC, 12 C.F.R. Pt. 229 (1996)).
54. For example, the Uniform Consumer Credit Code § 3.204 (1974), allowed payment to the
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belief that a number of proposed special consumer protection provisions were
not desirable because one rule best accommodated all system users, given
considerations of system efficiency, and it was better to benefit all users and
not just some, given the ability of all system users to protect themselves.
Finally, certain other proposed special consumer rules were rejected as
inappropriate either in nature or in necessity. For example, an error resolution
procedure 6 was rejected as imposing unnecessary costs57 and requiring an
enforcement system incompatible with the private law nature of the Code and
freedom of contract, that freedom being one of the Code's major
achievements in allowing accommodation of the statute to evolving
commercial practices and technological change. 58 A proposal to adopt a
bright-line system to allocate loss from forgery and alteration similar to that in
federal law 9 was rejected as ill-advised for checks. It was asserted that the
proposed system would have been more efficient and fairer than that of the
Code,' which makes the loss allocation initially to the institution on the basis
of noncompliance with the customer's order, but reallocates on the basis of
fault.6' However, no clear evidence seemed to support the argument that
original obligee until notice of assignment, thus qualifying U.C.C. § 3-602(a) (1995).
55. Two examples are instructive. First, the cost of using post-dated checks was allocated only to
persons desiring to employ that device, rather than to all users. See U.C.C. § 4-401(c) (1995) (mandating
that a customer must notify a bank if using post-dated checks). Checks are payment devices; if a user
desires credit, the user should protect himself or herself by obtaining credit through regulated channels.
Second, a requirement that more information be given about items on or with a customer's bank
statement, which would hamper truncation efforts and thus impede cost reduction benefiting all users,
was rejected in favor of allocating the risk from a lack of proper record keeping to those failing in that
respect. See U.C.C. § 4-406(a) & cmt. 1 (1995); Fred H. Miller, U.C.C. Articles 3, 4 and 4A: A Study
in Process and Scope, 42 ALA. L. REV. 405 (1991).
56. For an example, see 15 U.S.C. § 1693f (1994) (provision for electronic fund transfer error
resolution).
57. Empirical data to support legal proposals is remarkably hard to come by and often inconclusive.
Nonetheless, there are very few reported cases involving matters that an error resolution system would
address. See, e.g., Drier v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 520 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1983).
Thus, the cost of such a system seemed an unnecessary expense.
58. See U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b) (1995) (stating that one of the purposes of the UCC is to promote
"continued expansion of commercial practices through customs usage and agreement of the parties"); see
Miller, supra note 55.
59. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1693g (1994) (allocating up to the first $50 of loss to the consumer from
the unauthorized use of an electronic fund transfer device and the balance to the institution, except in two
clear cases of consumer negligence).
60. See Edward Rubin, Efficiency, Equity and the Proposed Revision ofArticles 3 and 4, 42 ALA. L.
REV. 551 (1991).
61. See U.C.C. §§ 3-406,4-401,4-406 (1995). These are the basic provisions. It may be worth notice
that in its Regulation E proposal for comment on stored-value cards, the Federal Reserve Board seems to
agree with the Code system in citing as one reason for potentially not applying Regulation E's limits on
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placing greater loss on the institution, by relieving some of the consumer's
obligation to help guard the system against fraud, would reduce overall fraud
losses and thus benefit all users, as opposed to some less careful ones.
That being said, it is clear from the enactment experience with revised
Articles 3 and 4 that opinions can and do differ on some of these points. That
observation is evidenced by the enactment experience with these Code
Articles in several states. In California, Consumers Union, which had not
substantially participated in the drafting process, effectively lobbied the
legislature and won several statutory and comment changes as the price of
enactment.62 Revised Articles 3 and 4 have yet to be enacted in New York
because of a dispute over the report of the New York Law Revision
Commission, which takes a contrary position on some of the above matters.63
Both sides have learned from this experience. Consumer organizations
now realize that a Code project, once begun, will proceed to widespread
enactment and, while special consumer protection provisions certainly can be
negotiated during the enactment process, greater progress is likely to be made
the earlier their interests are represented in the overall process.' Accordingly,
representatives from consumer organizations have been involved in the
revisions of Articles 2 and 9 from their inception.65 On the other hand, the
Conference and the Institute are reinforced in their belief, which has existed
from the beginning, that active consideration of consumer issues is necessary
liability for unauthorized use that it "may lead consumers to be more carefil." Electronic Fund Transfers,
61 Fed. Reg. 19696, 19701 (1996) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pL 205) (proposed May 2, 1996).
62. See supra note 49.
63. NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMM'N, REPORT CONCERNING PROPOSED REVISED ARTICLES 3
AND 4 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1996) (on file with author). For example, the report disagrees in part
with the uniform proposal to allocate fraud losses and instead would allocate to the bank a portion of any
loss from a forgery or alteration that might have been prevented by the bank had it actually examined the
item. Id. at 12-17. The uniform proposal does not consider a payor's failure to examine an item necessarily
as a failure to exercise ordinary care. The effect of the Law Revision Commission's nonuniform
amendment would tend to impede truncation at everyone's expense if it prompts a bank to examine items.
More likely, a bank will continue not to examine all items so the proposal will allocate risk to the payor
institution that it cannot economically guard against while at the same time decreasing the consequences
and thus possibly the incentive of the customer to take action to guard the system which is in the
customer's power to take. However, some would argue that the Law Revision Commission proposal will
encourage payors, who have the resources and knowledge, to develop technology to guard against fraud in
other ways, which will lower overall loss, and that it is more advantageous economically to force payors to
examine transactions than it is to force customers to do so. There also is a faimess argument where there is
an easily detectable forgery or alteration as the uniform proposal even in that case might allocate the entire
loss to a customer whose lack of exercise of ordinary care was comparatively slight.
64. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
65. Organizations represented include Consumers Union, The National Consumer Law Center, and
several legal services offices.
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in the Code revision process to have the maximum opportunity to build
consensus through the exchange of views, and thus the best possible chance
for rapid, and widespread, enactment of the Code. An additional lesson
learned, however, is that the search for the best balance or formula to gain
uniformity in this respect is not over.
II. THE FUTURE FOR CONSUMERISM AND THE CODE
A. The Articles 2 and 9 Process to Date
Given this background and the drafting committee chair's deep
involvement in the legislative experience with Articles 3 and 4 in California,
it is not surprising that early in the revision process for UCC Article 9,
Commissioner William Burke, the chair of the drafting committee, created a
task force from the drafting committee and its advisers and observers to study
what should be done concerning special consumer provisions in revised
Article 9.66 While that task force worked to identify issues and attempted to
devise possible solutions to those issues, the reporters for the Article 9 project
placed in the draft a number of special consumer provisions as proposals to
begin discussion. For example, an absolute bar rule was discussed for secured
creditor failure to properly repossess and dispose of collateral. Other draft
proposals also were discussed, but still others never received discussion by
the drafting committee because, before the drafting committee reached that
point, a crescendo of often strident protest arose over the inclusion of any
additional special consumer provisions. Indeed, protest arose over the failure
to address whether special consumer provisions already in Article 9 should be
adjusted, and the responses of those who desired preservation of the present
provisions, as well as the inclusion of additional provisions, prompted an
uneasy feeling that the process was getting out of control.67 Much of the same
66. The Article 9 Study Committee, which preceded the drafting committee and which operated
under the auspices of the PEB fbr the UCC, did not focus on this topic as its principal impetus, and was
concerned with perceived problems relating to business credit transactions. PERMANENT EDITORIAL
BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB STUDY GROUP UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
ARTICLE 9 REPORT 3 n.9 (1992). A discussion of the report appears in Fred H. Miller, The Revision of
UCCArticle 9,47 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 257 (1993).
67. See, e.g., Alvin C. Harrell, 1994 Meetings Refine Proposed Article 9 Revisions, 48 CONSUMER
FIN. L.Q. REp. 326, 336 (1994). Perhaps a number of observers, being unfamiliar with the process,
assumed the provisions included at an early stage to prompt discussion were destined for ultimate
enactment. Rather, such provisions are more akin to trial balloons; what is not raised cannot be considered.
Response is definitely called for, but overreaction does not advance deliberate discussion or consensus.
1997]
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heated discussion was occurring in the Article 2 revision process, and that
group did not have a task force or other group in place working toward what
perhaps could result ultimately in some sort of consensus.
These developments were of deep concern to the leadership of NCCUSL
and the Institute for a number of reasons. First, the vehemence of the
discussion threatened to undermine the viability of both projects.6 Second,
the Code is an integrated statute which should reflect, absent real differences,
a unitary policy on common issues. The lack of focus in the debates on
special consumer provisions in each Article gave no assurance that, were a
consensus reached, it would represent a sound and unitary policy, as opposed
to simply the view of one or another separate drafting committee. Finally, the
debate seemed to be proceeding without an adequate study of various
approaches to resolving problems, and even the problems needed better
documentation to gain proper recognition and acceptance as real problems.
Thus, a period for study and reflection seemed highly desirable.69
Consequently, NCCUSL and Institute leadership determined that
subcommittees of both the Article 2 and Article 9 drafting committees7"
should be formed. The subcommittees would meet over the following year
with a task force of consumer and industry representatives to identify
appropriate special consumer issues for each Article and attempt to reach
consensus on how to approach them and, if possible, specifically resolve
them.7'
During the following year, each subcommittee worked diligently, and at
the end of that period, reported back to the drafting committees on its
68. The New Payments Code experience was not forgotten in this respect. See supra note 40 and
accompanying text. Indeed, at this date certain representatives of creditor groups have ceased participation
in the discussion of consumer issues and have warned that, unless fewer consumer additions ultimately are
adopted, the revised Articles will be legislatively opposed. It is submitted that this is an ill-advised
strategy, as discussion may bring more progress than will a failure to participate, and the failure to bargain
is unlikely to be favorably viewed in the enactment phase.
69. As previously noted, another, but different, approach to the issue concerning special consumer
provisions and the Code was proceeding at this time. NCCUSL had determined to prepare a separate
consumer leasing act to complement Article 2A, and it was thought desirable to give that project some
time to develop to see whether it might represent an alternative approach to what was being discussed for
Articles 2 and 9, if the discussion there ultimately did not work out. See supra text following note 42.
70. The drafting committee for the revision of Article 2A was not included due to its limited charge
to conform the provisions of Article 2A to those of revised Article 2 unless differences existed that
warranted different treatment, and due to its separate consumer leasing act endeavor. Article 2B on
licensing also was excluded to the extent it was handling "consumer type" issues in a different manner
through distinguishing between mass-market licenses and other types of transactions.
71. Minutes of NCCUSL Executive Committee (Aug. 3, 1995) (on file with author).
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recommendations.72 The drafting committees, in turn, considered the reports
and, after discussion and minor amendment, forwarded the resulting
recommendations to NCCUSL's Scope and Program Committee, which met
at the NCCUSL annual meeting in July 1996 to consider its own
recommendation on the matter to the Executive Committee of NCCUSL.
The NCCUSL Executive Committee considered further the
recommendations received, found the recommendations from the Article 9
drafting committee to be compatible in concept, albeit potentially different in
detail, with those from the Article 2 drafting committee, and recommended
the following to the Commissioners, meeting as a committee of the whole, at
the 1996 NCCUSL annual meeting:73
1. As to Article 2,
[t]he Executive Committee recommend[ed] to the Conference that it
concur with the policy decisions of the Article 2 Drafting Committee
that there be no lessening of the consumer protection provisions of
Article 2 as originally promulgated by the Conference and as
interpreted by the courts and that the draft integrate as part of Article 2
the specific consumer protection provisions described in the list below
prepared by the Article 2 Drafting Committee...'
and further recommended that such specific consumer protection
provisions as are included should not be separately set forth in the text
of the statute. The provisions described included:
a. definitions of consumer, consumer contract, and consumer goods;
b. a provision subjecting Article 2 transactions to consumer protection
laws of the enacting state;
c. a provision on standard form agreements that would provide that a
consumer is not bound by terms not expressly agreed to if they would not
reasonably be expected by a consumer to be included in the agreement;
72. Reports were due before the drafting committees ceased their work for the year and prior to the
1996 annual NCCUSL meeting.
73. Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, San Antonio, Tex. (July 13, 1996) (on file with author and in
NCCUSL Executive Office, Chicago, IL.).
74. Id at 1.
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d. a provision rendering the no oral modification rule inapplicable to
standard form consumer contracts;
e. a provision requiring a disclaimer of implied warranties to be in a
record, and the seller to carry a burden of proof that the buyer expressly
agreed to it;
f. a provision giving a consumer buyer greater protection where a limited
remedy fails of its essential purpose;
g. that a limitation on consequential damages be presumed to be
unconscionable in a consumer contract where injury is to the person; and
h. a provision making, in a consumer contract, unreasonably high or low
liquidated damages agreements unenforceable.75
2. As to Article 9, [t]he Executive Committee recommend[ed] to the
Conference that it instruct the Article 9 Drafting Committee to continue the
protection of consumers in secured transactions and integrate into Article 9
such additional consumer protection provisions as may be deemed
appropriate by the drafting committee,76 and not to separately set forth in the
text of the statute the additional consumer protection provisions. The
Executive Committee also expressed the instruction the provisions should be
ready to be presented to NCCUSL at its 1997 Annual Meeting.
Discussion of the recommendations of the Executive Committee at the
1996 NCCUSL annual meeting was not particularly extensive. In the case of
Article 2 the discussion was brief because much had been at least tentatively
resolved by the recommendation unless the committee of the whole
completely disagreed with the general approach recommended.77 Moreover,
as to the details of the recommendation, seldom does the floor of the
Conference seek to limit the options of a drafting committee on its first
consideration of the proposed statute. Rather, discussion is directed toward
suggestions of problems with the provisions presented and possible
alternative ways to deal with those issues or other resolutions of the issues. At
most, general guidance through "sense of the house" resolutions is provided.
It is during the final consideration of the statute by the Institute (projected for
75. Id
76. Id at2.
77. The issues tentatively resolved were whether Article 2 should continue its present special
consumer provisions, whether some additional ones might be added, and in the latter case, whether the
additions would be integrated into the statute or segregated in one manner or another.
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May 1998) and by the Conference (projected for July 1997) where
differences of opinion, if they have not been resolved, are hammered into a
consensus by debate.
A withholding of discussion in the case of Article 9 was recommended
because many provisions in the statute had not been discussed by the drafting
committee and other provisions recommended by the consumer issues
subcommittee had not yet been introduced into the statute. The provisions
developed by the drafting committee pursuant to the recommendations will
be addressed by the Conference and the Institute at subsequent annual
meetings.
Thus, the future details of special consumer provisions in the Code are still
open, and even their existence is not settled.
B. Discussion of the Special Consumer Provisions Now to Be Considered
The Article 9 consumer subcommittee made fourteen recommendations
concerning special consumer provisions in relation to revised Article 9. The
most important, according to the consumer issues subcommittee, is a
procedural recommendation that the statute provide for an award of attorneys'
fees to a consumer who prevails in litigation if a prevailing creditor could
recover its attorneys' fees by reason of the contract. There is substantial
agreement that Article 9 now contains many provisions that furnish an
adequate remedy for secured-party misconduct, if a means to enforce those
provisions exists. The recommendation would be the step toward providing
that means, and a step that has proven successful in other consumer-
protection legislation.7" Of course, the narrow line to be walked in this context
is one of leveling the playing field on the one hand and of being careful not to
prompt unproductive litigation on the other. Accordingly, the
recommendation is that the statute only allow the award of attorneys' fees if,
by contract, the secured party is able to recover its attorneys' fees, should it
prevail.
A common device employed in consumer protection statutes is a
minimum statutory recovery or statutory penalty to be awarded to a
prevailing consumer. Such a provision not only provides an incentive to
78. See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1994). For a discussion of why taking
the step probably would not produce replication of the unfortunate consequences of the extensive litigation
under the original version of the Truth in Lending Act, see Fred H. Miller, Consumer Issues and the
Revision of UC.C. Article 2,35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1565, 1577 (1994).
1997]
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
enforce legal rights where the amounts involved are often small, but it also
acts to deter creditor misconduct. Article 9 already has such a provision in
consumer transactions.79 Nonetheless, a further recommendation for a
codified absolute bar rule as an option for a legislature to consider in
consumer transactions," which clearly is a form of statutory penalty, was
approved. The rationale is that this is the law by decision in ten states81 and
because there is unlikely to be a movement to overturn the rule in these states,
the legislatures should at least be able to consider the matter in the statute.
82
Having dealt with the problem of secured-party misconduct, the next
recommendation turns to a perceived problem of reasonable value not being
received for collateral that is said to exist even where all the proper steps are
taken. Present Article 9 tried to address this issue years ago when it
eliminated elaborate statutory safeguards in favor of a flexible standard,
designed to give the parties freedom to realize the best possible price for
collateral upon default.83 That scheme has been less than entirely successful in
that it has spawned much litigation over the general standard of "commercial
reasonableness." Secured parties have been penalized for minor missteps in
many cases, 84 but at the same time, according to consumer representatives and
others, they have failed to provide for commercially reasonable values being
received for collateral. Proposals to measure a deficiency by the difference
between the debt and the greater of either the actual disposition proceeds or
79. See U.C.C. § 9-507(1) (1995) (awarding the amount of the finance charge and 10% of the loan
principal or cash price to a prevailing consumer). The drafting committee approved, when it considered the
recommendations of the consumer subcommittee, the addition of a bona fide error defense to this
provision. While that would be an inroad on the current special consumer provisions in Article 9, it is
consistent with other consumer protection legislation and may be a desirable qualification given the shift in
balance that would occur if the attorneys' fee recommendation is ultimately incorporated into the revised
statute.
80. For a discussion of the absolute bar rule versus the rebuttable presumption rule, see Emmons
v. Burkett, 353 S.E.2d 908, 909-11 (Ga. 1987).
81. E.g., Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa. 1963), modified on
other grounds, 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1964); Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Peevy, 739 S.W. 2d 691 (Ark.
1987).
82. The recommendation would present the issue to the legislature rather than leave the matter up to
the courts, who are the source of the absolute bar rule in those states that have it. While this may result in
less flexibility in application, it will make the decision occur in a forum where the overall balance of the
statute can be considered, which the courts are presently unable to do.
83. See U.C.C. § 9-504 cmt. 1 (1995) (allowing parties to dispose of goods in a "commercially
reasonable" manner).
84. See, e.g., Spillers v. First Nat'l Bank, 400 N.E.2d 1057 (III. App. Ct. 1980). On the other hand,
the flexibility does allow a court to refuse to accept a process that would be allowable in a technical statute
but which produces egregious results. See, e.g., United States v. Willis, 593 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1979).
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the reasonable value of the collateral have been debated by the drafting
committee. However, the recommendation, upon which further discussion
will center, is limited to subjecting the price received and other aspects of the
disposition to particular scrutiny only if requested by the debtor and if the
purchaser of the collateral upon disposition is the secured party, a recourse
party, or a party related to them, because this is where the greatest chance for
an unwarranted loss exists.8"
Other recommendations, like the one better assuring reasonable value is
received for collateral, also look at making appropriate adjustments within the
overall policy objectives or current structure of present Article 9. One such
recommendation would add information about the right to redeem the
collateral, a contact point for information concerning that right, and
information about the possibility of a deficiency to the required notice of
intended disposition.86 A second recommendation would provide a safe
harbor for the timing of the notice of disposition (ten days), but would
exclude consumer transactions. A third recommendation would support
clarification of whether a purchase money security interest loses that status
under certain subsequent circumstances, like a refinancing or cross-
collateralization,88 but would add, in consumer transactions, a statutory
allocation formula for the application of payments to determine the extent of
the purchase money security interest if no allocation of payment by
agreement is provided. A final recommendation would make very broad
descriptions of the collateral in financing statements where filed in consumer
transactions, such as "all assets," ineffective.89 Such descriptions make it
85. The details of this recommendation remain to be fleshed out Issues such as what will satisfy the
heightened scrutiny (perhaps a showing that several better bona fide offers from unrelated parties were
received) and what constitutes a related party (related by ownership as in Luxurest Furniture Mfg. Co. v.
Furniture Warehouse Sales, Inc., 209 S.E.2d 63 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974), or beyond that to include a pattern of
business relationships) remain to be resolved.
86. See U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1995) (describing what constitutes present notice).
87. A safe harbor for both commercial and consumer transactions is a consensus concept, but no
agreement has been reached as to the description of that harbor, except in commercial transactions.
88. There is agreement that purchase money status should not be lost in either commercial and
consumer transactions under Article 9. Thus while this point is extremely important in consumer cases, it
is not a special consumer provision as it is applicable in all contexts. Whether the so-called "dual status"
characterization should apply for other purposes, such as Bankruptcy Code section 522(f), however, is
expressly left to the other law. See It U.S.C. § 522(f) (1994).
89. But see Draft, Uniform Commercial Code Revised Article 9, Secured Transactions; Sales of
Accounts and Chattel Paper § 9-504 (Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Oct. 1996)
[hereinafter Oct. 1996 Draft, Art. 9], available at <http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ulc.htm>
(visited on Mar. 28, 1997) (generally allowing such descriptions to be effective).
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unduly difficult to obtain subsequent financing and are seldom, if ever,
accurate.
The final group of Article 9 special consumer provisions recommended,
with one exception, are consistent with the foregoing pattern, in that they
involve no recommended adjustments at all or, at most, aim only at
clarification.9" The one significant exception is a proposal to add to Article 9 a
type of substantive special consumer provision normally found in separate
legislation.9' This proposal recommends a one-time statutory right to reinstate
the transaction if, at the time of default, the debtor has paid sixty percent or
more of the principal amount of the debt.92
The eight recommendations93 concerning special consumer provisions for
Article 2 likewise look only to adjustments within the overall policy
objectives or current structure of present Article 2, or only aim at clarification.
The approved Article 2 report does list nine further provisions that do or
might benefit consumers, but in that all of them are recommendations for both
consumer and commercial transactions, they should not be viewed as
additional special consumer provisions.94 For example, the once proposed
repeal of the statute of frauds hardly is a consumer driven proposition; indeed,
it may not even be viewed favorably from the consumer perspective.
Turning to the eight explicit consumer provisions, there is a
recommendation for consumer contracts95 that if a valid and exclusive agreed
90. Thus, one recommendation would add in the Official Comments clarification of the parties'
ability to agree upon standards, unless the standards are manifestly unreasonable. Although this ability
does not allow contracting for commercially unreasonable conduct, the Official Comments would further
point out the relevance of bargaining power and knowledge in determining the reasonableness of what is
agreed upon. Another recommended change in the Official Comments would clarify that taking easily
valued collateral far in excess of the debt owed under now section 9-505 may violate new Article 9's good
faith standard. A third recommendation would not extend Article 9 to include certain consumer collateral,
like a deposit account not represented by a certificate of deposit, even though like-collateral may be
included within Article 9 in a commercial context. A final group of recommendations would deny adding
special consumer provisions that commonly are found in separate legislation or regulations to Article 9,
such as the principle of the Federal Trade Regulation on Preservation of Consumer Defenses, 16 C.F.R. pt.
433 (1996), to section 9-206, and an antideficiency rule such as in UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §
5.103 (1974).
91. This right is similar to, but not the same as, the right to cure found in the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code, §§ 5.109-.111 (1974).
92. The 60% figure is based on the same analysis that lies behind that figure in present U.C.C. § 9-
505 (1995).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 73-76.
94. Subcomm. on Consumer Interests, UCC Article 2 Drafting Committee, Thoughts on the
Treatment of Consumer Issues in a Revised UCC Article 2 app. at 2 (1996) [hereinafter Art. 2
Subcomm. Report] (on file with author).
95. One of the eight recommendations is merely definitional. Thus, a consumer contract is a contract
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remedy fails substantially to achieve its intended purpose, the aggrieved party
may reject the goods or revoke acceptance and, to the extent of the failure
have other remedies as permitted in the statute, such as cover and damages.96
Proposed section 2-104(a)(2) and (b) in the NCCUSL 1996 Annual Meeting
Draft, and one of the recommendations, would subject the provisions of
Article 2 to the consumer protection laws of the enacting state.97 These
proposals essentially represent merely a more explicit statement of the same
rule in the current Article 2.9'
Proposed section 2-316(e) in the NCCUSL 1996 Annual Meeting Draft,
and the recommendation it represents, would require any disclaimer of an
implied warranty in a consumer contract to be in record form99 and
conspicuous, and the seller must establish by clear and affirmative evidence
that the buyer expressly agreed to the disclaimer to enforce it." While there
are some additional requirements in this proposal beyond those in present
section 2-316(2) or (3), they seem to be a matter of degree and to better
achieve the policy behind the provisions.01 These requirements will be
irrelevant in sales where there is a written warranty under the Magnuson-
for the sale of goods that when delivered are intended by the buyer primarily for personal, family, or
household use where the seller is regularly engaged in the business of selling and the buyer is an
individual. Draft, Uniform Commercial Code Article 2-Sales (199_) § 2-102(a)(10)-(12) (Nat'l Conference
of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, July 12-19, 1996) [hereinafter July 1996 Annual Meeting Draft, Art 2],
available at <http://www.law.upenn.edullibrary/ulclulc.htin> (visited on Jan. 10, 1997). There have been
subsequent drafts but no material changes except as noted. For subsequent drafts see
<http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ulc.htm>.
96. July 1996 Annual Meeting Draft, Art. 2, supra note 95, § 2-709(b)(2). This resolution is one
adopted by a number of cases. It admittedly is more favorable to the buyer than another alternative, which
preserves agreed limits not dependent upon the failed remedy, but the recommendation is more one for
clarity than substantive change. See Yvonne W. Rosmarin, Consumers R-Us: A Reality in the U.C.C.
Article 2 Revision Process, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1593, 1620 (1994).
97. July 1996 Annual Meeting Draft, Art. 2, supra note 95, § 2-104(a)(2).
98. See U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (1995) (where remedy falls of its essential purpose); id. § 2-102 (1995)
(setting forth the scope of Article 2); see also supra note 96.
99. A "record" is information that is inscribed on a tangible medium, such as a writing, or that is
stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form. July 1996 Annual Meeting
Draft, Art. 2, supra note 95, § 2-102(aX33).
100. Id. § 2-316(e). A clear way to accomplish this would be to price the goods with and without an
implied warranty and let the buyer select. Another way to deal with the matter is not to disclaim the
warranty, but rather to limit the remedy for any breach of warranty.
101. The latest draft of revised Article 2 drops the evidentiary part of the proposal and does not
require a conspicuous record. See Draft, Uniform Commercial Code Revised Article 2 Sales § 2-407(c)
(Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Jan. 24, 1997) [hereinafter Jan. 1997 Draft, Art. 2],
available at <http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulcfulc.htn> (visited on Mar. 10, 1997). As to the
requirement of"express agreement:' Official Comment I to present UCC section 2-316 states the policy is
to protect buyers from surprise. U.C.C. § 2-316, cmt. 1 (1995).
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Moss Act 2 and are far less restrictive than the complete prohibition of
disclaimers now embodied in nonuniform amendments to Article 2 in a
number of states. 3
Two recommendations't 4 that were approved earlier by the drafting
committee were later subsumed into the NCCUSL 1996 Article 2 Annual
Meeting Draft when these special consumer provisions in essence became the
general rules for all transactions. 5 A third recommendation, evidenced in
proposed section 2-210(b) of the NCCUSL 1996 Annual Meeting Draft,
renders a term in a consumer contract prohibiting modification or rescission,
except by a signed record, ineffective. 1 6 As a practical matter, it does not
actually extend present law. While present section 2-209(2) has no such
limitation, it does require a separately signed form when the form is supplied
by the merchant to a person who is not a merchant, 7 and fulfillment of this
requirement in consumer sales is virtually never accomplished.
That leaves only one recommendation in the context of Article 2 that may
be viewed arguably as going beyond present law in any significant way-the
provisions of proposed section 2-206 of the NCCUSL 1996 Annual Meeting
Draft relating to so-called contracts of adhesion.' A term in a record which
102. 15 U.S.C. § 2308(a) (1994). This provision eliminates the ability to disclaim an implied warranty
in a sale which includes a written warranty.
103. See supra note 19.
104. See supra note 94.
105. The recommendation that unreasonably high or low liquidations of damages are unenforceable in
consumer contracts made no real change in the law, unless it suggested that such agreements might be
enforceable in commercial sales. See U.C.C. § 2-718(1) & cmt. 1 (1995). Thus, the reformation as a
unitary rule actually kept present Article 2 without change.
Present section 2-719(3) makes the limitation of consequential damages for injury to a person in
the case of consumer goods prima facie unconscionable. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1995). Section 2-
709(d)(2) of the October 1, 1995 draft was in accord, and thus, the recommendation was only to keep
the present rule. However, section 2-709(c) in the 1996 NCCUSL Annual Meeting Draft employs no
presumption or prima facie language, and simply negates the ability to limit or exclude personal injury
damages. July 1996 Annual Meeting Draft, Art. 2, supra note 95, § 2-709(c). This was the practical
result under the prior rules, see, e.g., Collins v. Uniroyal, Inc., 315 A.2d 16 (N.J. 1974), and, given the
availability of strict liability in tort in most jurisdictions under which contractual limitations were not
enforceable, it was in essence the universal rule in both consumer and commercial sales. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). However, in late drafts the presumption is back,
and so, again, there is no change from present law. See Jan. 1997 Draft, Art. 2, supra note 101, § 2-
8 10(c).
106. See July 1996 Annual Meeting Draft, Art. 2, supra note 95, § 2-210(b). Late drafts reach the
same position by excluding consumer contracts from the rule. See Jan. 1997 Draft, Art. 2, supra note
101, § 2-210(c).
107. U.C.C. § 2-209(2) (1995).
108. This term is equated in the NCCUSL 1996 Annual Meeting Draft of revised Article 2 with a
"standard form" or a form containing "standard terms." July 1996 Annual Meeting Draft, Art. 2, supra
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is a standard form, or which contains standard terms to which a person has
apparently manifested assent"° by a signature or other conduct, is nonetheless
not part of a consumer contract if the consumer could not reasonably have
expected it, unless the consumer expressly agrees to the term."' On the other
hand, an argument can be made that even this provision does little more than
reflect an explicit application of the concept of procedural
unconscionability."'
C. Analysis of Recommended Special Consumer Provisions.
The work on fashioning a workable formula for special consumer
provisions in relation to revised UCC Articles 2 and 9 is not complete.
Several drafting committee meetings remain, as well as debate at the annual
meetings of the Conference and the Institute. What has been accomplished to
date, however, has greatly assisted in focusing the effort. As a result of this
work, there now appears to be strong although not universal agreement for
three fundamental propositions.
First, the special consumer provisions now in the Articles should, subject
to minor adjustments that may be necessary due to other revision, be
retained." 2 The reports of both consumer subcommittees, which were
note 95, § 2-206. A standard form is defined as a record prepared by one party in advance for general and
repeated use that substantially contains standard terms and is used in the transaction without negotiation of,
or changes in, the substantial majority of the standard terms. However, negotiation of price, quantity, time
of delivery, or method of payment does not preclude such status. Standard terms are terms prepared in
advance for general and repeated use by one party and used without negotiation with the other party. Id. §
2-102(a)(37), (38). Thus, a printed form where blanks are filled in for price, quantity, and delivery, even if
used in a commercial sale, is a standard form. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Automatic Sprinkler
Corp., 423 N.E.2d 151 (Ohio 1981). In later drafts the commercial employment of this concept has been
dropped, leaving the matter to the doctrine of unconscionability. See Jan. 1997 Draft, Art. 2, supra note
101, § 2-206 (limited to consumers).
109. To manifest assent, there must be an opportunity to review the terms, and to decline, followed by
conduct that under the circumstances, constitutes acceptance of the terms, such as a signature. July 1996
Annual Meeting Draft, Art. 2, supra note 95, § 2-102(a)(28).
110. Id. § 2-206(b). In later drafts, the concept that a consumer must reasonably expect the term in a
standard form in the type of transaction involved, still remains, but the provision provides a number of
factors to assist the court in determining that issue, and provides for an expedited hearing in a manner
similar to the case where unconscionability is raised. See Jan. 1997 Draft, Art. 2, supra note 101, § 2-206.
111. See generally I JAMES WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-3 (4th
ed. 1995) (discussing the concept of procedural unconscionability).
112. The report of the Article 9 subcommittee in relation to what some believe is a statutory penalty in
present section 9-507(1) states, "It seems politically difficult to cut back on a consumer remedy which has
been in the Code without serious complaint for 30 years or more." Memorandum from Article 9 Drafting
Committee, Consumer Issues Subcommittee (Marion Benfield et al.) to Article 9 Drafting Committee,
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approved by the drafting committees, agree on this proposition. The Article 9
subcommittee, for example, recommended the absolute bar rule as an option,
not because it was believed to be necessarily a sound rule, but because from
their experience with state legislatures, they believed more would be lost than
gained in trying to eliminate it. Clearly, retention is the bottom line for
consumer representatives. While secured creditor and seller groups have
spoken against the policy of retention because they then argue that they
receive nothing in return for agreement to any additional provisions, their
view is too narrow given that it is inevitable in any revision effort that they
will have to accept some addition considering the minimal consumer
protection in the present Code. Continuing to accept what one already has
learned to live with can be traded for more limited additional provisions than
otherwise might be the case, and ones that perhaps are more acceptable in
form. It is clear this in fact has happened.
The second area of general agreement is that Articles 2 and 9 should not
add a significant number of additional special consumer provisions."3 There
are a number of reasons for this proposition. First, as a matter of principle, a
special consumer provision should not be fashioned unless there is good
reason to believe that a unitary rule for consumer and commercial
transactions alike will not be satisfactory, either as subject to a high risk of
abuse given freedom of contract or as inappropriate given less knowledge and
bargaining power in consumers. Another reason is that the process in revising
the Code does not easily accommodate the desirable research that should be a
basis for the formulation of any new and untried provision." 4 To formulate
provisions in a factual vacuum may do more harm than good to the intended'
beneficiaries." 5 A third reason for not adopting a large number of special
Advisors, and Observers 3 (May 29, 1996) (on file with author) [hereinafter Consumer Issues
Memorandum). The report of the Article 2 subcommittee makes the same point, "the Article 2 revision
should, at a minimum, 'do no harm' to consumer interests. This, too, relates to enactability." Art. 2
Subcomm. Report, supra note 94, at 2.
113. The Article 2 subcommittee report for example states, "It seems preferable to state principles
that apply to all transactions," and cites present section 2-302 on unconscionability as an example. Art.
2 Subcomm. Report, supra note 94, at 4.
114. See Consumer Issues Memorandum, supra note 112, at 4 (indicating certain suggested
provisions were rejected by the subcommittee because of their uncertain economic effect).
115. This point has been consistently made by representatives of secured parties and sellers. While
their attempt to shift the burden of proof to consumer representatives to establish by empirical evidence a
need for any new provisions has not been embraced, it is clear that the reports of the consumer
subcommittees reflect that this argument has not gone unnoticed. Indeed, the Article 2 subcommittee
report states, "consideration should be given to some rewriting where-there is convincing empirical
evidence that the Official Text creates serious practical potential for unfair surprise or prejudice to
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consumer provisions is that there has been little success with widespread and
uniform enactment in arguably similar cases. For example, the Uniform (now
Model) Consumer Sales Practices Act was enacted in only a handful of
jurisdictions," 6 and the experience with the Uniform (now Model) Consumer
Credit Code, while somewhat better, was hardly an outstanding success."1 7
The lesson perhaps is that it is very difficult to reach a national consensus on
a significant package of consumer issues due to differences in the social,
economic, and political conditions in the states."' A further reason not to
include a large number of special consumer provisions in Articles 2 and 9 is
that in many states considerable legislation already exists to supplement these
consumers." Art. 2 Subcomm. Report, supra note 94, at 4 (the drafting committee deleted the word
"empirical" which appeared in the draft report).
While this practical approach is clearly correct (empirical evidence is not always available and
appropriate anecdotal evidence can be entitled to weight; legislation is a political process driven by
many considerations in addition to logic), the Article 9 subcommittee may have gone astray in the
recommendation for a right to reinstate. Empirical evidence developed by consumer creditors and
presented to the subcommittee demonstrates this is a right that could cost all consumers significant
money and is of little or no ultimate benefit (other than in the short run) to defaulting debtors.
However, the Article 9 subcommittee report, even with this research, seems to find "modest" benefit,
and then justifies it by asserting the proposal is likely to have so little economic impact that there is no
good argument not to implement it. See Consumer Issues Memorandum, supra note 112, at 12. This
seems a contradictory analysis coupled with an untested assumption. Consumer representatives have
presented a different perspective. Perhaps the answer lies in the observation that the creditor
representatives derive their statistics from a higher end of the market, and the consumer representatives
see a lower end of the market. Indeed, it appears at least some of the failure to reach agreement on
these issues may derive from the different perceptions about consumers and their needs that the
different sides have because their experience stems from different segments of the market. Hopefully,
recognition of this possible variance will assist in reaching an accommodation in views.
116. 7A U.L.A. 231 (1985 & Supp. 1996) (Kansas, Ohio, and Utah are the only jurisdictions that
have enacted the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act.).
117. 7 U.L.A. (1985 & Supp. 1996) (Colorado, Indiana, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming have enacted the 1968 version of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code); 7A
U.L.A. (1985 & Supp. 1996) (Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, and Maine are the only jurisdictions that
have enacted the 1974 version of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code). Colorado has a hybrid of the
1968 and 1974 versions of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code in force. 7A U.L.A. Supp. 1 (Supp.
1996).
118. See Consumer Issues Memorandum, supra note 112, at 3. Circumstances on the federal level are
somewhat different and often may simply ignore these differences, which state legislatures cannot. See,
eg., William D. Warren, UCC Drafting: Method and Message, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 811 (1993)
(describing the process of revising the UCC). NCCUSL is retesting the water on the state level in its
project to prepare a consumer leasing act. However, this project is not far enough along to determine
whether there is now a greater promise of success. Moreover, the conditions in this endeavor are somewhat
different fiom those involving Articles 2 and 9. Article 2A is enacted in most states, and the consumer
leasing act will be offered as an after-the-fact companion piece to states where there is a demand for it.
Revised Articles 2 and 9 still need to be enacted, and consumer representatives have signaled clearly that
their bottom line for enactment of these Code Articles is the inclusion, in an integrated fashion, of adequate
special consumer provisions in those Articles.
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Articles. When legislation has been worked out for a particular jurisdiction, it
is unrealistic to assume that conflicting provisions in Articles 2 and 9 will be
substituted for it."9 Accordingly, a very activist approach can be expected to
only engender controversy and ultimately nonuniformity 20
The inclusion of a broad range of special consumer provisions also may
conflict with the nature of the Code. As discussed, the Code, for the most
part, is a series of default rules subject to freedom of contract, with deliberate
flexibility built into the statutory rules. This point is often made in connection
with Article 2, with the drafters trusting the courts to properly apply the
flexible rules. Article 9 is sometimes seen as much more rigid and focused on
bright-line rules. But it all depends; for example, the "commercial
reasonableness" test in present section 9-504(3) is as flexible as anything in
Article 2.2 Whether the courts in either instance have earned the trust given
them is another issue.
But the point is, the nature of consumer provisions is different. To be
protective, the provision must be nonvariable and there must be adequate
provision for enforcement. Nonvariability is antagonistic to freedom of
contract, and if enforcement is to be accomplished by means other than an
administrative agency (a concept that itself is foreign to the Uniform
Commercial Code), provisions that do not discourage private actions are
required, such as minimum statutory recoveries (statutory penalties) and the
ability to recover attorneys' fees. The inevitable reaction, if this formula
coupled with other factors produces significant litigation, is a demand for
greater certainty from the statute, which is antagonistic to the Code principle
of flexibility. While it is clear Articles 2 and 9 now contain nonvariable
rules,' and some incentives for enforcement," ultimately it is a question of
119. As an illustration, consider UNIF. CONSUMER CREDrr CODE §§ 5.109-.11 (1974) (establishing a
right to cure a default in payment) enacted in some states (Colorado for one). If one recommendation of the
Article 9 subcommittee is followed, Article 9 will include a right to reinstate. On the whole, the latter right
would seem to be more acceptable to secured parties as they can control the collateral before reinstatement.
For the same reason, a right to cure should be more desirable for consumers as it prevents loss of the
collateral until the end of the cure period. But what benefit is there in re-debating this issue?
120. See supra note 119.
121. See U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1995).
122. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-501(3) (1995) (cannot waive rules which give rights to a debtor and impose
a duty on a secured party). The statute of frauds is said to be such a provision in Article 2. See id. § 1-102
cmt. 2.
123. See, e.g., id. § 9-404(l) ($100 penalty plus recovery of all additional loss if secured party in a
consumer transaction fails to file an appropriate termination statement); id. § 9-507(l) (if secured party
fails to comply with disposition rules, consumer can recover finance charge incurred plus 10% of
principal). Perhaps section 2-717 and other self-help remedies like rejection, id. § 2-601, can be viewed as
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degree. At some point, it is highly likely that irreparable damage to the nature
of the Code occurs if too much by way of special consumer provisions is
added.
Finally, scattering a significant number of special consumer provisions in
the Code and others in separate legislation may produce unsound results. In
short, integrating enough provisions into commercial law, while leaving
others to other law, as opposed to considering all such provisions as a whole,
can lead to an unintended result. To illustrate, a right to reinstate 24 clearly
will cause some increase in the cost of credit transactions. That cost may be
passed on to all consumers, who may be willing to pay it as a form of
insurance against loss of property from unanticipated circumstances. But
what if the cost cannot be passed on, perhaps because restrictions on finance
charge rates or on the amounts of default charges are severely regulated by
other law?'25 In that case, it is unlikely the creditor will absorb the cost as a
profit reduction; it is more likely that credit standards will be tightened to
eliminate the source of the cost. In that event, the very consumers intended to
be benefited may instead be excluded, and the provision, like a usury law,
will help no one because it neither helps those who need it nor those who do
not. Inclusion of a more modest amount of special consumer provisions in the
Code minimizes this type of risk.
There also seems to be significant agreement about the final fundamental
proposition. This proposition is that an appropriate formula for both Articles
is to add additional special consumer provisions only when there is
substantial agreement and a significant basis exists for their addition, they do
not unduly alter the nature of the Code, and they adjust unitary rules in the
Articles that are suitable for commercial transactions only to the extent that
there is a significant risk the unadjusted rules will cause adverse impact if
applied to consumer transactions. 1
26
such in Article 2.
124. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §§ 2.401, 2.502 (1974). The allowable charges
under this statute may be more than in many states.
126, The Article 9 subcommittee report states in its Introduction, "the question of coverage of
consumer issues in Article 9 involves... a judgment regarding whether there is sufficient consensus on the
appropriate substantive rule outside the Conference and the American Law Institute," and "the revision
process should do no harm to consumer interests." See Consumer Issues Memorandum, supra note 112, at
3.
The Article 2 subcommittee report is even more explicit in these regards, stating, for example,
"The most compelling cases [for new language to address consumer interests] will be those in which it
is clear there will be some substantial improvement realized from codifying an emerging consensus in
1997]
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However, within these basic propositions which have substantial support,
the devil certainly lies in the details. If agreement is not achieved here,
agreement at the conceptual level may be irrelevant. Clearly, the discussed
recommendations generated by the consumer subcommittees and approved
and modified by the Article 2 and Article 9 drafting committees are not
considered to be final. On some, such as protection of the collateral value
from an unreasonably low disposition price even in a commercially
reasonable disposition, the details remain to be fleshed out. On other
recommendations, details may be changed. 2 1 Indeed, on further consideration
some recommendations may ultimately be eliminated and, while the second
proposition previously discussed suggests that further recommendations
beyond those now tentatively approved should be slow to be adopted,'28 it is
conceivable that some additional recommendations could be incorporated
into the final product.
The question arises as to what standard should guide the completion of
this work and whether this standard suggests that the recommendations to
date are basically sound. The first question is easily answered; there is
consensus among the participants in the revision process that the standard
should be the ultimate enactability of the statute in fundamentally uniform
form. The Uniform Commercial Code is simply too important to the economy
of the country and to the perpetuation of the federal system to permit
significant nonuniformity through amendments, or through the failure to
enact the revisions.'29 The discussed recommendations, and perhaps other
the courts [or adopting experience reflected in the enactment of statutes]." See id.
127. See supra note 110 (discussing the change that has occurred in proposed section 2-206, see
July 1996 Annual Meeting Draft, Art. 2, supra note 95, § 2-206).
128. Some additional suggestions in the case of Article 2 that are consistent with the discussion in this
article are listed in Miller, supra note 78, at 1574-91. A fairly obvious candidate might be a limitation on
choice of law as in section 2A-106, unless that sort of limitation is built into section 1-105 in the revision
of Article 1, which has now begun. Another addition providing for reciprocal attorneys' fees for Article 2
enforcement is strongly suggested. See inra note 132 and accompanying text.
The Consumer Subcommittee of the UCC Article 9 drafting committee has considered some
additional proposals and the drafting committee agreed with a number of them. Some of these
"merely" refine prior proposals, such as determining what is a consumer secured transaction; for
example, should there be a dollar cap on the size of the transaction covered, or not? Others are aimed
at more substantive matters, such as should Article 9 adopt a so-called "one-action rule." These
proposals have not been considered beyond the drafting committee. To the extent that they progress,
they should be measured against the same standard as the proposals to date.
129. The Article 9 report in its Introduction states, "the final decision regarding the extent of special
consumer provisions in Article 9 must take into account enactability of the statute." Consumer Issues
Memorandum, supra note 112, at 3. The Article 2 report states equally flatly, "A matter of primary
concern must be the enactability of the proposed revised Article 2." Art. 2 Subcomm. Report, supra note
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limited provisions with appropriate fine tuning, should be enactable. There
are several reasons to believe so. First, developing limited, special consumer
provisions within the UCC while integrating other desirable provisions into
the more general provisions of the law maximizes the chances of ultimately
reaching consensus among all interested groups. 3 Consensus will promote
uniformity and avoid delays in enactment. 3' Certain benefits obviously flow
from uniform enactment, including lower transactional costs and fewer traps
for secured parties and sellers doing business across state lines due to
overlooking nonuniform amendments. For consumers, the benefits include
uniformity of rights and obligations that foster greater knowledge and
understanding of their legal position in a transaction. The opportunity to
achieve these benefits further reinforces the incentive to participate, and
ultimately should lead to promotion of, or at least not opposition to,
enactment.
Second, the recommendations to date for the most part fit well within the
overall policy objectives or structure of the present Code, or operate to clarify
its operation. To that extent, they should not be seriously objectionable, and
thus enactment should not pose significant difficulty. One possible exception
is the right of reinstatement proposed for Article 9. This recommendation can
be viewed as offending two aspects of the three fundamental propositions
94, at 1.
Pleas have been made for a broader view, but with explicit recognition that enactability would
suffer. See, e.g., Richard A. Elbrecht, The NCCUSL Should Abandon Its Search for Consensus and
Address More Dijicult and Controversial Issues Applying "Process" Concepts, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
147 (1994). But to erode the universal and fundamentally uniform enactment of the Code is simply too
great a price; any revision with that effect should instead be avoided. Commentators agree on the
desirability of uniform laws in the commercial law area. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H.
Kiobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (1996).
130. The provisions outside the Code can be targeted with local considerations which may vary
among jurisdictions. As to the limited Code provisions, if a particular interest group does not stay the
course in their development, the risk is that their point of view may be lost and they will face a statute
worse than if they had continued negotiating during the drafting process. Of course, opposition can be
mounted state by state during enactment, but that is expensive and that opposition may be further
weakened by the argument that the group had its chance during the formulation process and did not take
advantage of it.
131. It must be recognized that consumer provisions already in place in a jurisdiction when the
revised Code is introduced are unlikely to be disturbed. Thus in a given jurisdiction, some
nonuniformity in the Code consumer provisions may result. But, this very fact gives an interest group
that has stayed the course in the development of the Code consumer provisions an opportunity to argue
for some adjustment of the Code consumer provisions toward their point of view. While a degree of
nonuniformity thus may result, certainly overall, more uniformity will result than if no effort to reach
consensus ever was made or if the problem was made more difficult by the adoption of extensive
consumer provisions in the Code.
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arrived at by consensus. First, it goes beyond present Code policy, which only
allows redemption, and the provision does not represent a consensus position
as evidenced by present state laws. To the extent other state law contains a
right to reinstate, or alternatively a right to cure, there also is potential conflict
with revised Article 9 if this recommendation is included. Second, the
proposed rule may impose costs upon all consumers, or impede cost
reductions for all consumers, for the benefit of a few who, in most cases with
better management, should largely be able to avoid the difficulty in the first
place. Rules that cater to undesirable conduct are productive of more of the
same. Alternatively, this proposal may increase costs for secured parties who,
even if they can pass them on, may be reluctant to do so for competitive
reasons, and the provision intrudes upon the ability of a secured party to work
with its debtor, which there is every incentive to do without legislative
prompting or regulation. For the above reasons, this recommendation is likely
to cause, at the very least, delay in enactability. Finally, to the extent this
recommendation is not adequately supported by available evidence as to
possible benefits, its adoption can be cited as evidence that the process for
deciding which special consumer provisions are selected is arbitrary rather
than principled. That perception could undermine the necessary support for
other recommendations. Thus, very careful consideration should occur before
this recommendation is adopted.
On the other hand, the Article 2 recommendations for special consumer
provisions at present do not include a provision for reciprocal attorneys' fees
for a prevailing consumer, unlike in the case of Article 9.32 Such an
additional provision would be consistent with the standard of enactability.
Consumers would be supportive,' but so should creditors for several
reasons. For one reason, such a remedy will prompt better policing of the
occasional bad actor to the competitive benefit of creditors who do business
132. The Article 2 subcommittee report states, "One possibility offered is to establish a remedial
structure, including attorneys' fees for successful consumer litigants. While this type of fresh thinking has
considerable merit, the subcommittee believes that the approach of the drafting committee, which observes
the structure and history of Article 2, is preferable." Art 2 Subcomm. Report, supra note 94, at 3. The
discussion in this Article suggests that this conclusion is ill-advised. Particularly with respect to the
approach of Article 2 in relying on general rules to be sensibly applied by courts, an effective means of
achieving that goal is in keeping with the structure and history of Article 2.
133. Consumer groups believe the rights and remedies now available in Article 2 are important. They
believe, at a minimum, attorneys' fees and costs should be included as consumers' remedies under Article
2. Coupled with provisions recommended for Article 2 to keep other remedies free of waivers and
limitations, and limited protective provisions like proposed section 2-206 and further safeguards against
surprising disclaimers, consumer support is better assured. See Rosmarin, supra note 96.
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on fair and decent terms. Second, if there is a viable means for enforcing the
considerable rights afforded by Article 2, it will reduce the pressure for
additional special consumer provisions of a prophylactic nature that will
inevitably carry the detrimental effects of nonvariability and inflexibility
inherent in such provisions and possibly reduce the additional burden of
uncertainty of contract. Finally, stronger enforcement measures will tend to
focus the resultant additional costs on the creditors who generate them, rather
than on all creditors through additional compliance burdens imposed upon
them.
III. CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, the current recommendations concerning special
consumer provisions in relation to revised UCC Articles 2 and 9 appear to
hold considerable promise for the future of these two important statutes. The
recommendations, with the possible exception of the right to reinstate in
Article 9, and with the addition of a reciprocal attorneys' fee provision in
Article 2, basically are consistent with the policy objectives and the structure
of the present Code, or clarify areas that have proven troublesome in ways
that are defensible. Overall, the recommendations have the potential to reduce
litigation and transaction costs. The recommendations also are modest in
scope and detail, and thus should be eminently enactable. Moreover, what is
apparent is that the failure of interested parties to embrace these
recommendations, or a set of special consumer provisions very much like
them, will be fatal to the uniformity, the enactability, and thus, the continued
viability of what has been termed, with perhaps only slight overstatement,
"the grandest achievement of all time in the history of private statute
lawmaking."' 3
4
134. 1 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7 (student ed. 3d
ed. 1988).
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